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I. INTRODUCTION
Religious freedom under Israeli law is a complex issue. The questions
raised, and sometimes the answers, may seem counterintuitive from an
American perspective. The cultural dynamics of religious freedom in Israel
are somewhat opposite of those in the United States. In the United States,
religious freedom issues are often raised by religious minorities and
dissenters who seek redress for either government infringement of their
free exercise of religion or government support for, or endorsement of,
religion'-most often endorsement of the dominant form of religion in the
* Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. The author
thanks Mark Kende and the Drake University Constitutional Law Center for
sponsoring this symposium. Thanks also to the group of excellent colleagues who
participated in the symposium. Additionally, the author is grateful to Holly Shannon
for her research assistance.
1. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005)
(discussing religious endorsement in the context of displaying the Ten Commandments
in county courthouses); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding, on
the basis of formal neutrality, a state-sponsored program providing tuition assistance
for children to attend alternative schools, religious or secular, when the school district
in which a family lives is under federal court-ordered state supervision); Santa Fe
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (finding that student-led, student-initiated
prayer at public school football games violated the Establishment Clause);
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (rejecting free exercise claim by
members of a Native American church who were denied unemployment benefits after
being fired for ritual use of peyote); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (finding
government support of parochial elementary and secondary schools unconstitutional);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (upholding the free exercise claim of a
879
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relevant locale. 2 In Israel, however, the dynamic is the opposite. Religious
minorities have extensive religious freedom.3 In fact, the battle lines of
many religious freedom issues are drawn between secular and non-
Orthodox Jews and the Orthodox minority,4 which has been given
significant control over a number of status issues such as marriage,5
divorce,6 conversion,7 and food laws. 8
Israeli law relating to religious freedom takes a variety of forms.
There is no formal Israeli constitution.9 Unlike the United Kingdom,
however, constitutional law in Israel finds expression in a system of Basic
Seventh-Day Adventist when her unemployment benefits were denied because of her
inability to work Saturdays in accordance with her faith).
2. See, e.g., McCreary County, 545 U.S. 844 (upholding a preliminary
injunction ordering the removal of a Ten Commandments display from state
courthouses); Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 290 (holding that a public school policy allowing
prayer before football games violated the Establishment Clause).
3. See, e.g., HCJ 1113/99 Adalah Legal Ctr. for Arab Minority Rights in Isr.
v. Minister of Religious Affairs [2000] IsrSC 54(2) 164 (holding that the Ministry of
Religious Affairs violated the principle of equality in failing to grant to the Arab
minority an appropriate funding level for cemetery maintenance); Ruth Lapidoth,
Freedom of Religion and of Conscience in Israel, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 441, 446-47, 449-
50, 455-59 (1998) (discussing Israel's commitment to religious freedom).
4. See Barak Medina, Enhancing Freedom of Religion Through Public
Provision of Religious Services: The Israeli Experience, 39 ISR. L. REV. 127, 139-40,
144-52 (2006) (highlighting the appointment of Orthodox Jews to positions of power
over public areas and government programs).
5. Id. at 147; Arthur Gross-Schaefer & Wayne Jacobsen, If Not Now, When?
The Case for Religious Liberty in the State of Israel, 44 J. CHURCH & ST. 539, 544-45
(2002) (indicating that only Orthodox rabbis may perform marriages in Israel).
6. See Gross-Schaeffer & Jacobson, supra note 5, at 545; Medina, supra note
4, at 147 (illustrating that Rabbinical Courts hold exclusive jurisdiction over divorce
matters).
7. See Gross-Schaeffer & Jacobson, supra note 5, at 545.
8. See Medina, supra note 4, at 152 (explaining that the Chief Rabbinate has
significant control over business owners through the Prohibition of Fraud in Kosher
Food Act).
9. See generally Daphne Barak-Erez, From an Unwritten to a Written
Constitution: The Israeli Challenge in American Perspective, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L.
REV. 309, 312-17 (1995) (discussing the development and growth of Israel's
constitution); Dalia Dorner, Does Israel Have A Constitution?, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J.
1325, 1325 (1999) (explaining that Israel never realized its plan to draft a written
constitution); Yoseph M. Edrey, The Israeli Constitutional Revolution/Evolution,
Models of Constitutions, and a Lesson from Mistakes and Achievements, 53 AM. J.
COMP. L. 77, 78 (2005) (discussing significant constitutional developments in Israel).
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Laws, 10 as well as judicially expressed constitutional norms." In Israel,
concepts of equality and human dignity as set forth in Basic Laws, 12 the
founding documents and principles of the Nation of Israel, 13 treaties, 14 and
judicial opinions are relevant to religious freedom i" even though no Basic
Law explicitly defines its boundaries. 16
The lack of explicit constitutional boundaries regarding religious
freedom, 17 combined with the preference given to Orthodox religious
authorities, 18 has led to a culture war in Israel as the nation has become
more secularized and as the Reform and Conservative Jewish movements
have gained strength. 9 The dynamics of this culture war and the piecemeal
system of constitutional principles in Israel are the focus of this Article. I
suggest that the ebb and flow of narrow principles of religious freedom that
I have advocated in the context of United States constitutional law20 may
be a particularly useful concept in Israel, albeit for reasons quite different
than in the United States. 21
Part II of this Article provides a primer on Israeli law relevant to
religious freedom and the nature of Israeli constitutional principles. Part
III addresses the dynamics of the culture war that has evolved in Israel
between Orthodox Jewish authorities and non-Orthodox Jews. Part III
also explains why this dynamic has little impact on non-Jews in Israel, who
10. See Barak-Erez, supra note 9, at 313, 323-45; Edrey, supra note 9, at 102-
03.
11. See Elazar Nachalon, Structural Models of Religion and State in Jewish
and Democratic Political Thought: Inevitable Contradiction? The Challenge for Israel,
22 ToURo L. REV. 613, 624-25 (2006) (providing examples of judicially-expressed
constitutional norms).
12. Barak-Erez, supra note 9, at 313, 323-45.
13. Id. at 315-17.
14. Lapidoth, supra note 3, at 448, 458-59.
15. See Barak-Erez, supra note 9, at 313, 323-45; see also Edrey, supra note 9,
at 102-03.
16. See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
17. See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
18. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See FRANK S. RAVITCH, MASTERS OF ILLUSION: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES 153-67 (2007) [hereinafter RAVITCH, MASTERS OF
ILLUSION]; see also Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to
Neutrality: Broad Principles, Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REV.
489, 544-47 (2004) (discussing a proposed test for Establishment Clause cases in which
the importance of different principles ebbs and flows based on the context).
21. See infra Part IV.
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surprisingly often enjoy greater religious freedom than non-Orthodox
Jews. 22 Part IV will suggest interpretive principles that may be highly
relevant in regard to religious freedom issues in Israel. Part IV will also
explore why the use of ebbing and flowing narrow principles of religious
freedom may be better suited to religious freedom issues in Israel than
reliance on broad overarching principles. Part V will provide a brief
conclusion.
II. ISRAELI LAW AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
From the date of its founding, the Nation of Israel has recognized
principles of religious freedom and nondiscrimination. 23 These principles
are reflected in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of
Israel-often referred to as the Israeli Declaration of Independence 24-and
have been recognized repeatedly by the Israeli Supreme Court.25 The
Israeli Declaration of Independence states, in relevant part:
THE STATE OF ISRAEL will be open for Jewish immigration and
for the Ingathering of the Exiles; it will foster the development of the
country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; it will be based on
freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it
will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its
inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom
of religion, conscience, language, education and culture; it will safeguard
the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be faithful to the principles
22. See Medina, supra note 4, at 138-39, 147-52.
23. See, e.g., Natan Lerner, Religious Liberty in the State of Israel, 21 EMORY
INT'L L. REV. 239, 241, 243 (2007) (citing Declaration of the Establishment of the State
of Israel, 5708-1948 1 LSI 3 (1948) (Isr.)) (addressing the founding principles of
religious freedom and equality but noting practical problems raised by the character of
the "Jewish State" notion).
24. Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 5708-1948, 1 LSI 3
(1948) (Isr.), available at http://www.mfa.gov.ilIMFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+
Peace+Process/Declaration+of+Establishment+of+State+of+Israel.htm.
25. See, e.g., HCJ 1113/99 Adalah Legal Ctr. for Arab Minority Rights in Isr.
v. Minister of Religious Affairs [2000] IsrSC 54(4-5) 164 ("Therefore, from the State of
Israel's first day, the declaration established the principle of equality as one of the basic
values of the State. Over the years, the principle of equality was established and
developed, via legislation and case law, and has also earned for itself, beyond the status
of a basic value, the status of a basic right. ... Discrimination on the basis of religion
or nationality in allocation of state funds, which is even prohibited if it is done
indirectly, certainly is a fortiori prohibited when it is done directly.") (citation omitted).
[Vol. 57
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of the Charter of the United Nations. 26
Recognition of principles, however, is not the same as consistently
following them. Like many nations, Israel has struggled with the tension
between the broad principles it espouses and the practical reality of
applying those principles to a complex and diverse society.27 In fact, the
governmental structure in Israel poses one of the greatest obstacles to
realizing the broad religious freedom envisaged in the Declaration. 28 This
is because the party system in Israel often requires larger political parties
to ally themselves with smaller parties in order to form a coalition
government, and many of the smaller parties are religious parties. 29 In
order to gain the cooperation of these smaller parties on key issues,
coalition governments often have made concessions on issues involving
religion.30 Therefore, the larger political parties like Labor and Likud-
which may not oppose removing authority over status issues such as
marriage from Orthodox authorities-maintain Orthodox authority in
order to keep the government together.3 This has led to a great deal of
public dissatisfaction among the non-Orthodox majority.3 2
There is no separation of synagogue, mosque, or church and state in
Israel.33 The government provides funding directly to religious authorities
for matters such as maintenance of places of worship, holy sites,
cemeteries, and other matters of relevance to the various religious
communities.34 Moreover, until recently there was a formal ministry of
religious affairs, which was dominated by Orthodox interests and which
oversaw many of the issues mentioned above.35 The ministry no longer
exists, but its responsibilities were split among other governmental
26. Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 5708-1948, 1 LSI 3
(1948) (Isr.), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFAIPeace+Process/Guide+to+
the+Peace+Process/Declaration+of+Establishment+of+State+of+Israel.htm (emphasis
added).
27. See Gross-Schaefer & Jacobsen, supra note 5.
28. See id. at 545-47.
29. See id. at 545.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 545-47.
33. See Lerner, supra note 23 (noting practical problems in the religious
freedom context raised by the idea of the "Jewish State").
34. See, e.g., Gross-Schaefer & Jacobsen, supra note 5, at 545-47; Medina,
supra note 4, at 133-34, 148-55.
35. Nachalon, supra note 11, at 624.
2009]
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entities.36 As noted above, Orthodox authorities are given the power to
determine the validity of marriages, conversions to Judaism, and other
issues (but only as it relates to Jews-other religious communities are
governed by their own rules).3 7
There is, however, free exercise of religion in Israel. 38 No one is
required to be part of any faith or engage in any religious exercises, and
most Israelis do not identify as Orthodox.39 Of course, these free exercise
rights are seriously compromised in those areas in which Orthodox
authorities are given control over status issues. 40 This conflict has helped
fuel the culture war in Israel between Orthodox authorities and the
majority of the Israeli public.41 A natural question one unfamiliar with
Israeli law and history might raise is: How did Orthodox authorities gain
power over status issues in the first place? The answer comes from a
concept called "the status quo."
Prior to the founding of the Nation of Israel, British and Ottoman
authorities gave various recognized religious communities power over a
variety of issues that had religious significance, including marriage, divorce,
and education. 42 During that era-most of which occurred before the rise
of the Reform, Conservative, and Reconstructionist Jewish movements-
Jewish religious concerns were addressed by Orthodox practices. 43 Under
the British Mandate, even secular Jews could be governed by religious rule
on issues such as marriage, and the recognized religions controlled the
36. Id.
37. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
38. Lapidoth, supra note 3, at 445 (quoting the Declaration of the
Establishment of the State of Israel, 5708-1948, 1 LSI 3 (1948) (Isr.), available at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Declaration
+of+Establishment+of+State+of+Israel.htm).
39. See Gross-Schaefer & Jacobsen, supra note 5, at 545-47 (suggesting that a
majority of Israeli Jews may not be Orthodox).
40. See id.; see also supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text; infra Part III.
41. See Gross-Schaefer & Jacobsen, supra note 5, at 545-47. An interesting
example of this culture war is the issue of abortion. Jewish Law leaves room for
several possible approaches, but Orthodox political actors are the primary supporters
of antiabortion laws and regulations. See Noga Morag-Levine, Imported Problem
Definitions, Legal Culture and the Local Dynamics of Israeli Abortion Politics, in
ISRAEL: THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AND CONTINUITY 226, 230-32 (David Levi-Faur
et al. eds., 1999).
42. See Lerner, supra note 23, at 251-53.
43. See id. (indicating that deference was granted to religious minorities in
matters of land and family and, as such, Israel became "the only modern State in the
world lacking a territorial law of marriage and divorce").
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rules governing a number of status issues. 4
When the Nation of Israel was founded, it seemed clear that there
would likely be tension between secular Jewish movements and religious
movements. 45  The new government-for reasons disputed by some
historians and political scientists-decided to maintain the status quo on
religious issues, leaving status issues under religious control.46 Therefore,
the system of religious authority that existed under the British Mandate,
and before that under Ottoman rule, was merged into the new Israeli
government and legal structure. 47  As Israeli culture has grown more
diverse, more secular, and more focused on civil liberties, this initial
compromise has fostered significant backlash. 48
Many raise questions regarding what it means to be a "Jewish State,"
and whether Orthodox authority or broad personal freedom better reflect
the nature of a "Jewish State. '49 That debate is beyond the scope of this
Article. I will assume that broad religious freedom can be consistent with a
"Jewish State," but even if this assumption is incorrect, religious freedom is
consistent with Israeli legal principles. The hard question is the definition
of religious freedom in a context in which Orthodox authorities have been
given significant power, but are seeing that power diminish as government
and society change.
Two Basic Laws passed in the 1990s are highly relevant to any
discussion of religious freedom under Israeli Law: Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty 50 and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.5' These
Basic Laws have been important additions to the law governing religious
freedom, despite the fact that their text does not mention religious
44. See id.
45. See Gross-Schaefer & Jacobsen, supra note 5, at 542-43.
46. Id. at 543 (explaining that leaders of the new government, because of its
delicate nature, sought to preserve fragile pre-state unity through various concessions).
47. See Lerner, supra note 23, at 251-53.
48. See Gross-Schaefer & Jacobsen, supra note 5, at 545-47.
49. See, e.g., Gross-Schaefer & Jacobsen, supra note 5; Lerner, supra note 23;
Nachalon, supra note 11.
50. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 1391, available at
http://www.mfa.gov.il[MFA/MFAArchive/1990_1999/1992/3/Basic%2OLaw- %2OHuma
n%20Dignity%20and%2OLiberty-.
51. Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 1994, S.H. 90, available at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1990_1999/1994/3/Basic%2OLaw- %20Freed
om%20of%200ccupation-.
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freedom. 52 The Israeli Supreme Court has read religious protections into
these new Basic Laws.53 Moreover, judicial review of new legislation that
conflicts with the Basic Law of Human Dignity and Liberty has been
acknowledged by the Supreme Court of Israel.54 This is important because
the power of judicial review-which would allow the judicial branch to
strike down legislation that conflicts with a Basic Law or judicially created
right-is not a given in the Israeli system.55
Israeli courts regularly strike down administrative action-even
action pursuant to valid legislation-when it conflicts with individual and
civil rights protected under Israeli law, but legislation is generally superior
to the power of the courts.5 6 Only Basic Laws that include what are known
as "entrenched" provisions may be applied by the courts to strike down
conflicting legislation.5 7 If a provision is not entrenched, courts have no
authority to strike down legislation that a court believes conflicts with the
Basic Law. 58 If a provision is not entrenched, a court in a given case may
invalidate the execution of a law that the court finds to be in conflict with
civil rights or liberties found in the Basic Laws, decisions of the Supreme
Court of Israel, treaties, or the Declaration of the Establishment of the
State of Israel-usually after applying a balancing test.59 Yet, as noted
above, in most situations courts may not strike down the legislation itself.
Based on its structure and text, Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty has been found to include entrenched provisions, at least as to
future legislation.60 Unlike most entrenched provisions, the entrenchment
is not explicit, but rather is based on the text of the Basic Law; as the law is
written it is hard to escape the conclusion that conflicting legislation passed
52. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., HCJ 3872/93 Mitral Ltd. v. Prime Minister [1993] IsrSC 47(5) 485
(finding freedom of occupation infringed when import permits were denied to
businesses dealing with non-Kosher meat).
54. See Barak-Erez, supra note 9, at 326-31 (discussing the contours of
judicial review of the Basic Laws).
55. See id.
56. See id. at 326.
57. Id. at 326-28 ("The entrenched provisions are those which, according to
the Basic Law, can be amended only by the vote of a special majority of Knesset
members.").
58. See id.
59. See HCJ 292/83 Temple Mount Faithful v. Commander of the Jerusalem
Region Police [1984] IsrSC 38(2) 449, 455.
60. See Barak-Erez, supra note 9, at 327-29.
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after its enactment can be struck down by the courts.6 Thus, not only has
this Basic Law been held to recognize religious freedom as a fundamental
right, but the power of judicial review is available to strike down new laws
that conflict with that right.62 This newly expanded right may prove to be a
powerful tool when applied to the principles of equality, nondiscrimination,
and the general prohibition of religious coercion.63 Thus, principles of
equality, individual liberty and dignity, and noncoercion have all been
recognized in the Israeli religious freedom context.
III. THE CULTURE WARS
The sociologist James Davison Hunter utilized the term "culture
wars" to describe the battle lines drawn in American society between
religious and social conservatives, who seek cultural and governmental
recognition of their values and beliefs, and religiously liberal or secularized
members of society, who seek to protect individual rights and freedoms
against majoritarian and governmental encroachment, and to keep
government out of the business of supporting or endorsing religious beliefs
or values. 64 Interestingly, Israel is in the midst of its own culture war. The
Israeli culture war is between an entrenched and politically powerful
Orthodox minority and the secularized, or non-Orthodox, majority, whose
members are legally bound to follow Orthodox rules on issues such as
marriage and conversion, 65 and are also subject to Orthodox-influenced
rules governing food, 66 working on the Sabbath, 67 and other activities on
the Sabbath. 6  The players on both sides of this cultural divide are
61. See id.
62. See id. Original versions of both the Basic Law of Liberty and Human
Dignity and the Basic Law of Freedom of Occupation left open the potential that any
legislation that conflicts with those Basic Laws could be struck down, but when the
religious parties realized this, they moved to amend the Basic Laws so that only future
legislation could be invalidated by the courts in the event that it conflicts with the Basic
Laws. See id. at 328-31. These amendments also added language intended to require
certain considerations in determining whether a new law is invalid because it conflicts
with the Basic Laws. See id.
63. HCJ 1113/99 Adalah Legal Ctr. for Arab Minority Rights in Isr. v.
Minister of Religious Affairs [2000] IsrSC 54(5) 164; Lapidoth, supra note 3, at 455-46.
64. See JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO
DEFINE AMERICA (1991).
65. See Gross-Schaefer & Jacobsen, supra note 5, at 545.
66. See Medina, supra note 4, at 148-52.
67. See Lerner, supra note 23, at 262-65.
68. See Gross-Schaefer & Jacobsen, supra note 5, at 545-46 (indicating
Sabbath restrictions have been extended to public transportation, shops and other
2009]
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Jewish.69 The battle is heavily facilitated by the party system in Israel and
the strange political bedfellows it creates. 70
Unlike the culture war in the United States, however, where the
divide is partially fueled by conservative backlash against social and legal
victories by progressive players,71 in Israel the culture war is fueled by
progressive backlash against the entrenched and legally-empowered
conservative minority.72 The progressives are, however, beginning to win
more victories, such as the disbanding of the Ministry of Religious
Affairs, 73 the new Basic Laws, 74 and numerous judicial opinions
recognizing broader civil rights and liberties. 75 The Supreme Court of
Israel has played an increasingly important role in balancing the status quo
against individual rights, often in favor of individual rights. 76
For non-Jews in Israel, religious freedom issues often center on the
principle of equality, specifically in the funding area.77 As noted above,
Israel's government provides funding for maintenance of religious needs
and places. 78 In this regard, only certain communities-such as Muslims,
various Christian denominations, Bahai, and Druze-are recognized by the
government, and thus receive government funding. 79 The government does
not interfere with other denominations, but those communities do not
receive funding. 80 The funding may be tied to the percentage of the Israeli
population made up by a recognized group, but however it is allocated, it
need not be formally equal; rather, the allocation must be substantively
equal. 81 Sometimes the funding is not dispersed as it is supposed to be, and
entertainment facilities, and even to professional soccer).
69. See id. at 545-47.
70. See id.
71. See generally HUNTER, supra note 64.
72. See Gross-Schaefer & Jacobsen, supra note 5, at 545-47.
73. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 50-63 and accompanying text.
75. See Medina, supra note 4, at 133-34, 141-42, 146, 149-50, 152-54.
76. See id.; see also Lerner, supra note 23, at 248, 262-63, 265-68, 272-73.
77. See, e.g., HCJ 1113/99 Adalah Legal Ctr. for Arab Minority Rights in Isr.
v. Minister of Religious Affairs [2000] IsrSC 54(5) 164 (addressing Arab claims of
funding inequality against the Ministry for Religious Affairs for maintenance of Arab
cemeteries).
78. See Lerner, supra note 23, at 254-55.
79. See id. at 254.
80. Id. at 254-55 (indicating nonrecognized denominations have full religious
freedom and receive tax benefits, but do not receive government funding).
81. See HCJ 1113/99 Adalah Legal Ctr. for Arab Minority Rights in Isr. v.
888 [Vol. 57
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representatives of the relevant non-Jewish community sue.82 These suits
have been repeatedly successful in the Supreme Court of Israel based on
the principle of equality.83 Additionally, the government protects the holy
sites of all the major religions against desecration and allows freedom of
access.
84
As for other religious freedom issues, non-Jewish communities in
Israel are given control over their own affairs, and the government does
not generally interfere with the decisions of these religious communities.8 5
Thus, while Friday night and Saturday are essentially imposed days of rest
for Jews in much of Israel because businesses are generally closed and
there is limited public transit,86 non-Jewish communities may determine
their own days of rest-an ability that might be viewed as fostering variable
blue laws.87 Non-Jewish communities are not bound by the decisions of the
Orthodox Jewish authorities on issues of marriage, divorce, and status.88
Of course, like Jewish Israelis, non-Jewish Israelis may not be forced by the
government to worship in any manner or to profess any faith or creed.
These communities are relevant to the broader geopolitical dynamics in the
region, but ironically they have greater religious freedom and autonomy in
Israel than do secular Jews.8 9  While non-Jewish communities are
important players in many of the civil and human rights issues facing Israel,
they are not major players in Israel's internal culture wars.
Amidst this cultural divide, several principles have come to the fore in
addressing religious freedom issues. Long-established principles of
equality and nondiscrimination apply-but are less helpful-to non-
Orthodox Jews, because they must be applied in a system that supports a
preferred establishment on a number of relevant issues. 90 Thus, non-
Minister of Religious Affairs [2000] IsrSC 54(6) 164.
82. See id. pt. 4.
83. See, e.g., id. pt. 5 ("Discrimination on the basis of religion or nationality in
allocation of state funds, which is even prohibited if it is done indirectly, certainly is a
fortiori prohibited when it is done directly.").
84. See Lapidoth, supra note 3, at 451.
85. See Lerner, supra note 23, at 254-55.
86. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
87. Hours of Work and Rest Law, 5711-1951, 5 LSI 125 (1950-51) (Isr.).
88. See Lerner, supra note 23, at 253 ("Religious law is the rule in matters
related to personal status, and the recognized religious communities have retained
their jurisdiction.").
89. See Gross-Schaefer & Jacobsen, supra note 5, at 544-47.
90. See id.
2009]
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Orthodox Jews cannot be discriminated against or denied equal rights in
most areas, but when it comes to issues covered by the status quo, these
principles do not seem to apply.9 For example, no Jew can be married in a
legally binding ceremony by a rabbi of his or her choice unless that rabbi is
Orthodox. 92
Yet, other principles have come into play that may yet alter this
dynamic, even as to the status quo. Principles of religious liberty and
human dignity have become more relevant. 93 Even notions of separation
of religion and state and the suggestion that the Orthodox should be
accommodated but not preferred have arisen. Yet, while many pragmatic
legal and political compromises have occurred, much of the rhetoric on
both sides suggests that one or more of the concepts of equality,
preferentialism, liberty, human dignity, separation, or accommodation
should govern as a broad principle.
IV. BROAD AND OVERARCHING OR NARROW YET FLEXIBLE
PRINCIPLES?
There may be a way to facilitate the movement toward greater
religious freedom while allowing for recognition of, and support for,
aspects of the traditional Orthodox role in Israel. In my book, Masters of
Illusion: The Supreme Court and the Religion Clauses, I argued that ebbing
and flowing narrow principles are more useful in interpreting the religion
clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution than
broad principles such as "neutrality" and "original intent. '9 4 I argued that
the latter were merely illusions in the religion clause context, and that
rather than providing objective interpretive norms, they covered up the
actual modes of analysis that the Justices were using. 95 The principles that
I proposed could ebb and flow in the context of interpreting the United
States Constitution are equality, liberty, separation, accommodation, soft
originalism, and pragmatism. 96 A similar approach may be useful in Israel.
One cannot ignore the fact that Israel has a legally preferred religion
91. See id.; see also Lerner, supra note 23, at 253-54.
92. Lerner, supra note 23, at 253.
93. See Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 1391, available at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFAMFAArchive/19901999/1992/3/Basic%2OLaw-%2OHuma
n%20Dignity%20and%2OLiberty-.
94. See RAVITCH, MASTERS OF ILLUSION, supra note 20, at ix-x.
95. See id. at 1-36, 153-67.
96. Id. at 47-105, 164-65.
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in some contexts, so unlike in the United States, preferentialism is an
appropriate principle to include in the ebb and flow of principles. Yet
equality and liberty are also key principles. 97 Moreover, accommodation
and pragmatism are useful and have been used in the Israeli context.
98
Finally, while there is no formal separation of religion and state in Israel,
the concept of separation has been recognized as a useful one, even if it
plays a relatively insignificant role. 99 The question of original intent is a
complex one in Israel; of course most of the framers of the Basic Law of
Liberty and Human Dignity and other laws are still alive, 100 but for reasons
I suggest in Masters of Illusion, any sort of strong originalism is problematic
even under these circumstances. 10 1 To the extent that soft originalism
might be useful, it is already reflected in the other principles, from
preferentialism on one side to religious liberty on the other. 102
The tension between the "status quo" and an increasingly secular and
non-Orthodox religious public has led to both sides of the debate calling on
broad principles. The most ardent among the Orthodox often rely on
notions of what it means to be a "Jewish State," and suggest that
preferentialism and religious law should govern. Those on the other side of
the debate have argued for neutrality and natural rights principles. As I
have argued elsewhere, principles of neutrality, religious law (in a civil
context), and natural rights often are used to cover up other modes of
interpretation that drive legal analysis.103
For Orthodox authorities, these other modes may include
authoritarianism, accommodationism, dogmatism-which is not necessarily
a negative in religious contexts, depending on one's views-and a set
definition for what is considered "Jewish." For progressives, these modes
97. See supra Part II.
98. See RAVITCH, MASTERS OF ILLUSION, supra note 20, at 87-105, 165.
99. See Gross-Schaefer & Jacobsen, supra note 5, at 543-45.
100. See Barak-Erez, supra note 9, at 337-40 (stating an argument for original
intent might be tenable because "[a]fter all, the relevant events are recent, and all the
politicians involved are still available to testify as to the original intent").
101. See RAVITCH, MASTERS OF ILLUSION, supra note 20, at 1-6, 81-82
(arguing originalism is "a debate that no one can really win" because the plethora of
alternative views of what "the" original intent was creates a situation where it is
difficult to decipher the "true" intent, if such a thing even exists).
102. Cf Barak-Erez, supra note 9, at 338-39 (rejecting the value of originalism
generally in the Israeli context and arguing that if original intent is to play a role, it
should be a form of soft originalism based on the prevailing public opinion that drove
the recent Basic Laws).
103. See RAVITCH, MASTERS OF ILLUSION, supra note 20, at ix-x.
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may include concepts of personal autonomy and liberty-which might
suggest a separation of self and religion that is artificial for the devout-
progressive notions of equality, and support for separation of religion and
state. Of course, on each side of the cultural divide there may be many
who share some of the underlying values and views expressed on both
sides. This has actually led to some fruitful dialogue on what principles
might motivate and underlie constitutionalized religious freedom in
Israel. 104
In fact, a number of constitutional provisions have been proposed by
progressive and Orthodox interests working together. 10 5 None have passed
or gained wide acceptance, but the simple fact of their existence suggests
that common ground is possible. Abandoning reliance on broad principles
will better enable the sides to understand each other and perhaps find
common ground. Moreover, regardless of whether such common ground is
found by the parties, open reliance on the narrower principles proposed in
this Article will allow lawmakers and judges to better balance interests in
making and interpreting law.
Let us now explore how these ebbing and flowing principles might
work. The following discussion is simply illustrative, and one may reject
my specific proposals and even the narrow principles I suggest in favor of
others. The key is that the focus be on ebbing and flowing principles that
reflect the modes of interpretation that underlie much of the rhetoric in
this area, rather than on the broad, unreachable principles that fuel much
of the rhetoric. 10 6 Israeli scholars, legislators, and judges are far more
qualified than I to engage in a detailed discussion of the ebb and flow of
religious freedom principles, but the following demonstrates what such an
approach may suggest.
As noted above, preferentialism has long been a governing principle
in Israel in matters governed by the status quo. In other areas, equality
and liberty have become major principles used by courts and invoked by
legislators. 107 Yet most of the major issues regarding religious freedom
104. See Nachalon, supra note 11, at 627-31.
105. See id. (discussing the projects "Foundation for a New Covenant among
Jews in Matters of Religion and State in Israel" and "A Constitution by Consensus"
and a proposal for a comprehensive constitution developed by the Constitution, Law,
and Justice Committee of the Knesset).
106. See RAVITCH, MASTERS OF ILLUSION, supra note 20, at 192.
107. See supra Part II.
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relate to the status quo: marriage, 108 regulation of foods, 1 9 shopping and
entertainment on the Sabbath,110 public transportation on the Sabbath, 1'
recognition of non-Orthodox conversion,112 and determinations as to who
is a Jew more generally. 1 3
The Orthodox authorities are losing on these issues in a piecemeal
fashion. Yet they still dominate on some of the most important issues like
marriage and conversion. Principles of religious equality, liberty,
pragmatism, and accommodationism all point to an approach of
accommodation in Israel. This approach would recognize Orthodox
authority in predominately Orthodox communities. In other communities,
and nationally, non-Orthodox Jews would be accommodated. Thus, in and
around predominately Orthodox communities, concerns about noise and
light pollution would require the current strict rules regarding the Sabbath
to be enforced, such as the closing of all business and amusement
establishments and the exclusion of public transit. At holy sites such as the
Western Wall, the current status quo could be maintained."' Oversight of
restaurants that hold themselves out to be Kosher should remain with
Orthodox authorities. Similarly, the recent Israeli Supreme Court decision
requiring the Chief Rabbinate to grant Kosher food certificates to Kosher
restaurants that are open on the Sabbath or engage in other activities not
favored by the Chief Rabbinate, but which are unrelated to the Kosher
nature of the food sold at the restaurant, would not apply to "glatt" Kosher
establishments. 115
Significantly, accommodation of those who do not share these beliefs
and practices would also be required. Therefore, in areas that are not
predominately Orthodox, businesses should have the option to be open on
the Sabbath and holidays, public transit could run, and museums could
open. The needs of secular and non-Orthodox Jews could also be
accommodated in the recognition of civil, reform, and conservative
108. Medina, supra note 4, at 147; see also Gross-Schaefer & Jacobsen, supra
note 5, at 545.
109. See Medina, supra note 4, at 152.
110. Gross-Schaeffer & Jacobsen, supra note 5, at 545-46.
111. Id. at 545.
112. Id.
113. Lerner, supra note 23, at 247-49.
114. The current status quo would include existing Israeli Supreme Court
decisions recognizing certain religious freedom and egalitarian rights at the wall, while
maintaining strong Orthodox influence. See Medina, supra note 4, at 133-34.
115. See id. at 149.
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marriages. The basis for this accommodation would lie in the principles of
religious liberty and equality. 116
Moreover, while the validity of Orthodox conversions would be
presumed both for domestic and law-of-return purposes, as they are today
under the principle of preferentialism, Reform and Conservative
conversions could be recognized under the law of return and, where
relevant, for civil law purposes. Orthodox communities, businesses, and
institutions would not be made to recognize such conversions. All of this
has been proposed by others under broader principles. Yet those who
oppose these positions have used broad principles to reject these
accommodations as too strict or too lenient. By balancing liberty and
equality with preferentialism, however, with none of these principles being
utilized in a universal sense, a legal structure can be legislatively and
judicially implemented.
When judicial review is available, this balance could be judicially
imposed, not because universal notions of religious liberty, equality, or
neutrality demand it, but because narrower principles of liberty and
equality balanced with historical preferentialism and pragmatism suggest it
as the best alternative. 117 A secular person's liberty to engage in all sorts of
business activities might infringe on an Orthodox person's liberty to
observe the Sabbath. When liberty and equality are used as broad
principles, these "liberties" are in inherent conflict. One view must prevail
for such "liberty" to be recognized, and one must be more "equal" in the
government's bailiwick. As narrow principles, both of these individuals'
liberty and equality may be recognized.
Because preferentialism is also a governing principle, a form of
communal segregation would be allowed. In other words, if one chooses to
live in B'nai Brock, certain neighborhoods in Jerusalem, or other Orthodox
communities, one can be expected to be forced by community standards
backed by law to adhere to Orthodox norms, at least publicly. On the
other hand, if one chooses to live in more secularized communities, one can
expect to be able to shop on the Sabbath, and so on. Nobody may be
forced by law to believe anything in any community, but one may be forced
by law not to infringe upon the preferred Orthodoxy in some communities,
or to live one's religious norms within more secularized society in other
communities-as Jews have successfully done in many countries, including
116. See supra Part II; see also RAVITCH, MASTERS OF ILLUSION, supra note 20,
at 47-71.
117. See supra Part II.
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the United States. The government may favor the erection of eruvim11s to
support religious enclaves in secularized areas, but it could not force
nonreligious individuals or businesses to follow the Sabbath within those
boundaries.
This is the benefit of narrow principles in a nation that has long
recognized government preferentialism. Religious liberty can mean
different things in different communities and for different individuals.11 9
When other principles ebb and flow with liberty to allow a more fluid
balance between individual rights and community norms, the tension
between individual rights and communal traditions can be minimized.
Minimizing these tensions is essential for religious freedom in Israeli law
and society.
V. CONCLUSION
The suggestion in this Article to utilize ebbing and flowing narrow
principles in effectuating and interpreting religious freedom in Israel makes
a great deal more sense than reliance on broad overarching principles or
purely pragmatic short term compromises. In this regard, Israeli
jurisprudence is a step ahead of the United States because the Israeli courts
have already used this ebbing and flowing modal approach. There is a risk,
however, that as the Supreme Court of Israel expands religious freedom, its
reliance on broad principles will prove illusory except to those who already
accept those principles, and this may cause the culture war to continue and
expand. It is better to lay the balance on the table openly and address it
through the ebb and flow of principles than to play an all-or-nothing hand
that is likely to lead to little substantive change.
118. An eruv, Hebrew for "mixing" or "blending," allows various places, both
public and private, to be blended together on the Sabbath. Within this space,
observant Jews may carry objects and engage in certain activities otherwise prohibited
on the Sabbath. See Barry Smith, On Place and Space: The Ontology of the Eruv, in
CULTURES: CONFLICT-ANALYSIS-DIALOG 403, 403 (Christian Kanzian & Edmund
Runggaldier eds., 2007).
119. Cf RAVITCH, MASTERS OF ILLUSION, supra note 20, at 47-55 (explaining
religious liberty in the United States).
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DISCUSSION
DR. LAURA DUDLEY JENKINS: Touching on this British
legacy-there is a critique that courts in India engaged in divide and rule,
that so-called minority rights are a strategy to divide and rule, and I am
wondering about that legacy in Israel. I looked at a case where a minority,
the Jains, was kind of lumped into a bigger majority so their identity was
destroyed, in a way. I am wondering in Israel about the Druze because in
that case it seems that the state is subdividing minorities in to smaller
minorities which is another kind of strategy that may not be in the interest
of those minorities, particularly in a democracy, if the identities are
separated and that distinction is reinforced through state action.
PROFESSOR FRANK RAVITCH: It is an interesting contrast.
There are similar writings to what you have said about India-the British
did sort of use it as a divide and conquer. And of course the Israelis have
taken that British mandate, but they have broken the groups down to
recognize some of the other demographics. I will say in the case of the
Druze, they see themselves as a separate community. You have to
understand in Israel, religion and culture are not really separable so much
in Judaism, as in Hinduism. It is why in Israel, as in India, prostheletizing is
seen as very intolerant. But the problem is that when the Druze are
categorized as a "religious group," that really has a cultural meaning. I
mean, Druze are Muslim. But they see themselves as a separate cultural
group from the Palestinians, and actually the Druze petitioned to be
recognized. Originally Israel recognized them as part of the Muslim
community. There is also recognition of a small Shi'a population-the
majority of Muslims in Israel are Sunni-but there is recognition of both of
those and it is up to those groups how they want to govern. But the Druze
actually petitioned. And then, in the 1970s, the Bedouin petitioned, and it
was granted. And the view is that because religion and culture are not
necessarily separable, it is okay that these are part of the same. So, I am
not sure I would attribute a lot of divide and conquer techniques to the
Israeli government over history. But in this particular area, it is really not;
it is generally the groups themselves that petition. Therefore, the Bahai
has since become a recognized group. It looks like the Quakers may be
next.
PROFESSOR MARK KENDE: Frank, I have a question for you.
You said, if I got you right at the end, that free exercise is more extensive
in Israel than the United States. That really struck me as an interesting
comment, so I would love to hear just a couple examples of that. And then
you talked about obviously the major division being these culture wars
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between orthodox and secular. I am just wondering, are there not-and
maybe I do not know this, maybe this is hotly disputed-but the Palestinian
community certainly has fights and there are claims about to whom
Jerusalem belongs, there are claims of human rights violations in other
areas. Whether those claims are valid or not, doesn't that play over into
some arguments of suppression of religion? Or has Israel actually been,
within the bounds of the confinement of Palestinians, let's say to certain
areas, been pretty tolerant of Palestinian free exercise?
PROFESSOR FRANK RAVITCH: Well, there are two answers
there. In fact, the first answer goes a long way to the second. In terms of
free exercise of non-Jews in Israel, it is actually very, very strong. It is
something that is very counterintuitive when you look at modern politics.
But if you look at various complaints-and human rights complaints-
freedom of religion is virtually never mentioned by any of the human rights
groups and so forth. One of the reasons is that the Israeli government has
a complete hands-off approach when it comes to non-Jewish groups, as
well as Jewish groups, outside of the status quo where there is a real lack of
free exercise regarding marriage and other issues for Jews. But there is a
general hands-off approach. Also, the Israeli Supreme Court has
interpreted the human dignity law to-it is not exactly the opposite of
Employment Division v. Smith, but the balancing that is applied to free
exercise of Palestinians and others looks a lot like a compelling interest.
You almost need a national security sort of interest to inhibit the free
exercise, or a real threat of violence to inhibit free exercise-something
that in the United States we would call a compelling interest. So the fact
that there may be some generally applicable laws, as we have in the United
States under the Smith doctrine, would not be enough to fail to recognize
free exercise rights. With that said, there are virtually no generally
applicable laws that would apply in these communities religiously, but the
security laws are the ones that are an issue.
In terms of the second aspect of it, it is sort of a fascinating thing
when you look at the human rights issues. The territories are separate
from an Israeli legal perspective-when it comes to religion, they govern
themselves completely. This is not because of anything I have spoken
about; this is because they are not seen-and we know the reality of it-but
they are not seen as being under Israel's bailiwick for these purposes. So
within Gaza and the West Bank, they have religious self-determination,
and so that is not the issue. The real question is Israeli Arabs, who are
obviously mostly Palestinian. In that context, the rule that I just mentioned
applies, and the general notion is that unless there is some sort of
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compelling national security reason or real concern about violence, they
are not going to interfere with anything. In fact, when the heads of the
Dome of the Rock said that they did not want soldiers at the top of the
Dome area, the Israeli government actually complied. Now any time else
when any sort of Palestinian group says that it does not want soldiers there,
the Israeli government does comply. But the human rights issues are very
real. This is just a strange area. I always say it is counterintuitive because,
in this area, Israel is ahead of other occupying forces in terms of religious
freedom in the West Bank and Gaza because of self-determination. Then
within Israel, there is a lot of religious freedom. If a Muslim group claims
that it is different from the Sunnis-like the Jains are saying to the Hindus
in India-the group just petitions and it either becomes recognized, or a
non-recognized community, and its members are still completely protected
in their free exercise. A non-recognized group would get tax breaks, but
they would not necessarily get funding for cemeteries and things like that.
PROFESSOR ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA'IM: I was just
curious about the "hostage situation." The major political parties, Likud
and Labor, are really held hostage to the Orthodox parties. I understand
that is due to the electoral system-the Israeli electoral system-under
which these four parties always have enough power to negotiate. Why
wouldn't the two major parties get together to change the electoral laws so
that they are not hostage to these ultra-Orthodox Jews?
PROFESSOR FRANK RAVITCH: That has actually been a
movement within Israel. Unfortunately, I think it has been more a
movement in the public. Trying to get Likud and Labor together on
issues-the best American analogy I could give would be like trying to get
the right wing of the Republican Party together with the Democrats. There
are huge ideological differences. What is interesting, and it is an
interesting illustration, is that under the previous administration, before
Netanyahu was elected, they had gotten rid of the Ministry of Religious
Affairs, which was an actual ministry that allocated funds and so forth.
This happened in 2005. It was amazing how many of the Orthodox parties,
when Likud was trying to form a coalition government, were willing to give
up on X, Y, and Z other things simply to get the Ministry of Religious
Affairs back. People were afraid. This was viewed in Israel as a big thing
that the Ministry of Religious Affairs was gone, and it was because that
prior coalition government worked more with Russian immigrant parties-
and there are liberal Orthodox parties-and so they worked with the
liberal Orthodox parties. Unfortunately, when that coalition broke down,
now Shas and some of the more right-wing Orthodox parties want to bring
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back the Ministry of Affairs, and Likud will give in because their other
option is to work more with Labor. But what you are seeing-and you
probably noticed it with the merger of the middles of the two parties-I
think there are people in both parties realizing that it cannot last this way.
The public backlash is so extreme that they are going to have to do
something about it. And there is a new party that was actually in control
for a short period of time called Merkaz. Merkaz would be like if you took
the moderate Republicans-all three that are left [laughter]-I am a
former Republican. I stress former. And the moderate Democrats-there
are still a few of them left-and you put them together into a party, and
that was Merkaz. But the problem is there was so much inward pressure
from both sides that the other two parties were able to break down Merkaz
a bit. But I think Merkaz may be that middle ground you mentioned. I
think right now Likud and Labor people are jumping to Merkaz in small
numbers, and if it becomes an influx, that is what will happen.
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